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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

TROY MICHAEL KELL,
Petitioner/Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,

Appellate No. 20070234

Respondent/Appellee.

Trial No. 030600171

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARGUMENT
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT DID NOT CORRECTLY RULE ON POSTCONVICTION RELIEF FOR CLAIMS THAT PETITIONER RAISED AND LOST ON
DIRECT APPEAL.
In section II of the Appellee's Brief beginning on page sixteen, the State argues that
all of the issues raised under Argument I of Petitioner's Brief were previously raised on
direct appeal and that, therefore, these arguments are misplaced and are procedurally
barred. However, this Court in Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006), adopted the
ABA Guidelines for duties of post-conviction counsel. ABA Guideline 10.15.1(C)1 states:
Post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not
previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards
applicable to high quality capital defense representation, including
challenges to any overly restrictive procedural rules. Counsel should make

The ABA Guidelines that were in effect at the time of the original trial in 1994 were attached as
Addendum C to the Brief of the Appellant. However, at the time of this appeal and the Court's
ruling in Menzies, the Court referred to the 2003 Guidelines. Therefore, counsel in this Reply Brief,
as it effects current counsel's duties, will refer to the 2003 Guidelines. When referring to trial and
appellate counsel's duties, Petitioner is referring to the 1989 Guidelines.

every professionally appropriate effort to present issues in a manner that will
preserve them for subsequent review.
See, Addendum "A."
In the commentary, the Guidelines state:
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is of critical importance that counsel on
direct appeal proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a manner that
maximizes the client's ultimate chances of success. "Winnowing" issues in
a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues abandoned by
counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another case and
ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later. When a client
will be killed if the case is lost, counsel should not let any possible ground for
relief go unexplored or unexploited.
In addition, the commentary of the Guidelines state:
As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel has a
duty in accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all arguably
meritorious issues. These include not only challenges to the conviction and
sentence, but also issues which may arise subsequently. Collateral counsel
should assume that any meritorious issue not contained in the initial
application will be waived or procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation,
or barred by strict rules governing subsequent applications. Counsel should
also be aware that any change in the availability of post-conviction relief may
itself provide an issue for further litigation. This is especially true if the
change occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have
affected strategic decisions along the way.
Counsel understands that the Court in footnote 13 of Menzies stated:
We do not read this guideline to require or encourage the litigation of issues
that are clearly procedurally barred, although we recognize that whether an
issue is so precluded must often be explored and raised by counsel.
Current counsel has argued that the Court's decision to dismiss claim 8 of the
Petition, denial of the right to a public trial by trying him inside the prison, has been laid out
in detail with supporting law from a sister state which had to be presented at this point to
give this Court the opportunity, if it so desires, to change its minority position to that of the
majority position, i.e. that it is unconstitutionally prejudicial to try a defendant inside of a
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prison or jail setting.
This Court has stated before that it can revisit issues that have already been
litigated and have been deemed procedurally barred. In Tillman v. Utah, 128 P.3d 1123
(Utah 2005), this Court stated in paragraph 2 1 :
When evaluating a post-conviction claim for good cause, courts should
generally decline to review a contention of error where the error "is
something which is known or should have been known to the party," and
therefore could have been raised at an earlier time. Brown v. Turner, 440
P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968). "Nevertheless, howsoever desirable it may be
to adhere to the rules, the law should not be so blind and unreasoning that
where an injustice has resulted the victim should be without remedy."
Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979); see also, Hurst v. Cook,
111 P.2d at 1036 ("[l]t has long been our law that a procedural default is not
always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged
that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in
harmony with constitutional standards."). Thus, even where an issue could
have been raised in a previous post-conviction petition, post-conviction
review may be available in those rare cases," Martinez, 602-P.2d at 702, or
"unusual circumstances" where "an obvious injustice or a substantial and
prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred" that would make it
"unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue, Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1035; cf.
Andrews v. Shulsen, 773 P.2d 832, 833 (Utah 1988) (declining to review a
petition for post-conviction relief where the petitioner failed to show good
cause for not raising the claim of constitutional error in a previous postconviction petition).
Although not exactly on point, Petitioner believes this Court in Tillman was pointing out that
there are unusual circumstances that would make it error or unconscionable not to
reexamine the issue. Petitioner strongly urges the Court to reexamine this prison trial
issue.
Astoclaims9,10,11,13,14(a)and 15(b) of the Petition, Petitioner has pointed out
that these were a violation of the then applicable ABA Guidelines as referenced in the
Appellant's Brief.
The State posits in its Brief that Petitioner had to make his "best showing" on his
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burden of proving ineffective assistance and cited to the Court's decision in Brandt v.
Springville Banking, 353 P.2d 460 (1960) that:
summary judgment has a 'salutary purpose in our procedure because it
eliminates the time, trouble and expense of trial when, upon best showing
the plaintiff can make, he would not be entitled to a judgment.'
Counsel did not put in the sentence before that statement which states:
We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting litigants to fully present their
case to the court, and though summary judgment prevents this, for that
reason courts are and should be reluctant to invoke this remedy in
commenting on the facts. Id.
Most recently this Court cited Brandt in Barnes v. Sohio, 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981)
and stated:
Motions for summary judgment serve the salutary purpose of eliminating the
time and expense of a trial when a party is entitled to relief on the law as
applied to undisputed facts.
There are disputed facts in this case and those have been pointed out. This Court
also said in Barnes:
Because the remedy is preemptory, a court in considering a motion for
summary judgment must view the facts and the inferences from those facts
in the light most favorable to the party moved against. (Citations omitted.)
Id.
As has been previously argued, the failure to meet the standards set by the ABA
Guidelines is in and of itself ineffective assistance of counsel. See, Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510(2003).
The State in its Brief refers to the areas where present counsel showed that trial
counsel failed to investigate the possible objections that could have been raised to the
CUCF facility trial setting. (See Appellee's Brief, page 21.) Simply because there is no
case law or controlling authority on these issues does not mean that they are not areas that
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should not have been investigated and objections made thereon. Petitioner believes trial
counsel missed arguments under the Utah Constitution open courts provision of Article I,
§11.
The State cites State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 as to the proposition that the evidence
produced must have been reasonably likely to have effected the outcome of his trial or
appeal. Counsel feels that the State has cited Taylorlor a proposition that that case does
not maintain. Page 687 of that case is a discussion as to whether Taylor's counsel should
or should not have used mitigating evidence that was in Taylor's attorney's possession in
the penalty phase of Taylor's trial. The court indicated that decision was a strategic
decision. Petitioner believes that the holding in that case was contained in this paragraph:
Taylor has not suggested a helpful strategy that would have been supported
by evidence not known to Levine. Failure to investigate mitigating factors
can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only where such factors
actually exist and may be productively used in the penalty phase. Id.
Therefore, the State's reliance on Taylor io support its argument that there was no
evidence presented that could have been used at the guilt phase or at pretrial phases of
this case is misplaced. See, State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681, 687 (Utah 1997).
The State also has cited to State v. Gulbransen, 106 P.3d 734 (Utah 2005), as
upholding its assertion the claims were not presented before the District Court. The
holding in the Gulbransen is an issue where the nurse practitioner preserved some
evidence, but that evidence was lost at the state crime lab. The defense did not allege bad
faith under the Youngblood doctrine at the trial level. No evidence was submitted at the
trial level as to the intention of the police officer or the state crime lab with regard to that
evidence. This court then stated:
[a]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised
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on appeal. (Citations omitted.) We have further determined that the
requirement of raising a claim at trial before bringing it on appeal "applies to
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred."
In this case, Gulbransen failed to raise his claim before the district court and
is thereby barred from making such a claim before us.
Clearly, Petitioner's claims were made at the district court level, so the State's
reliance on "no argument of plain error or exceptional circumstances" does not defeat the
claims that have been presented to the trial court and the summary judgment issued
thereon. Therefore, the State's reliance on Taylor is misplaced.
II.
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD
HAVE CHALLENGED THE DEATH QUALIFICATION PROCESS OR THE TRIAL
COURT'S REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINITIONS.
Counsel again in its Brief refers to the Gulbransen case, and again relies on a
misplaced reading of that case. Counsel did not have to allege plain error or exceptional
circumstances under Gulbransen to preserve those issues here.
The State then refers this Court to Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, and refers to
paragraph 49 of that decision wherein the court states:
while Lafferty does raise a number of issues that were not raised on direct
appeal, he fails to show how appellate counsel's failure to raise them on
direct appeal amounted to constitutionally deficient performance. Lafferty
assumes that the omission fo these claims constitutes "the very kernel of
ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior counsel actually provided
effective assistance, then these claims would have been brought on direct
appeal." These assertions misconstrue the premise of our ineffective
assistance of counsel standard. Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise
"every non-frivolous issue on appeal . . . [and may] 'winnow out' weaker
claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely to prevail." Carter
2001 UT 96, H 48 (quoting Banks, 54 F.3d at 1515).
This is in direct contradiction to what the ABA Guidelines have stated in 10.15.1.
See, Addendum A. The direction given in the Guidelines commentary indicates that:
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'Winnowing' issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences. Issues
abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another
case and ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed later.
Therefore, Petitioner does not feel that this is a set of arguments on these two
claims that can be "winnowed" and that the trial court should have allowed evidence to be
heard thereon.
III. PETITIONER'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO SEEK
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW OF AN ISSUE THAT PETITIONER LATER LOST ON
PLENARY APPEAL
Counsel disagrees with the State that the burden is to show the best showing and
that the burden shifted to Kell on summary judgment on this or any other issue. See,
Argument I, Id. The burden for summary judgment is on the State, not on Petitioner.
IV.
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENTS ON PETITIONER'S REMAINING CLAIMS.
Counsel incorporates by reference all the arguments in Petitioner's Argument I
supra.
Additionally, counsel for the State indicates that a mere failure to comply with ABA
Guidelines will not demonstrate deficient performance and cites the Court to Menzies v.
Ga/ef/ca, 150 P.3d 480 at fl 90 (Utah 2006). Counsel does not believe that Menzies stands
for that proposition. In fact, it is apparent that Menzies stood for the opposite proposition,
that post-conviction counsel must meet the post-conviction guidelines set out by the ABA
Guidelines. ("Because Utah's post-conviction rules do not currently contain any provisions
regarding counsel's performance in post-conviction death penalty proceedings, and
because it is traditionally the duty of the courts to supervise the performance of counsel,
we rely on the ABA Death Penalty guidelines to the extent that they are relevant to our
decision.") See, Menzies at f[ 90.
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In fact, the United States Supreme Court has held that the ABA Guidelines are a
minimum standard by which death penalty cases shall be judged when ineffective
assistance of counsel issues are raised. In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), the
United States Supreme Court stated:
Counsel's conduct similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense
work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) - - standards to
which we long have referred as "guides to determining what is reasonable."
Strickland, supra, at 688; Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 396.
The State has long and consistently fought against the applications of these
standards. Petitioner feels that if the State is so concerned about these Guidelines, that
it must agree that trial and appellate counsel fell below those standards. However, the
State also seems to argue that trial counsel and appellate counsel did not fall below those
standards. Petitioner would request that the Court adopt the trial and appellate ABA
Guidelines for its standards as it has in the post-conviction arena. If this Court feels that
those standards have been met by trial counsel, then the issue is moot as the State
contends. If trial and appellate counsel have not met those standards, then this case
should be remanded back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on those failures.
V. OBJECTION TO CASE STATEMENT
The State in its case statement on pages 3 through 9 fails to comport to the Utah
R. App. P., Rule 24(a)(7). Rule 24(a)(7) A Statement of the Case, in relevant part states:
"The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of the
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the
issues presented for review shall follow. . ."
The State's case statement is merely a parade of terribles of issues that were
presented during the trial and during the penalty phase, but are not a statement of the
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course of these proceedings. These statements are not an indication of the disposition in
the court below, nor are the statements of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review on the motions for dismissal on summary judgment. The State's case statement
is merely an attempt to inflame this court against the petitioner. It is not disputed by the
petitioner that this is the testimony that was presented. It is disputed by the petitioner that
it is not relevant under the Rules for the purpose of enlightening the Court as to the nature
of the case in a procedural way.
The mark of a civilized country is how it treats its most uncivilized citizens. Utah has
put these post-conviction procedures in place to protect the rights of those who are
sentenced to die. The petitioner objects to the State's gratuitous use of these inflammatory
statements when they have no relevance to the Appellate Rules.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the trial court erred in dismissing and granting summary judgment on
all of the Petitioner's claims in his Writ and the case should be remanded back to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing on all issues.
DATED this

7-

day of March, 2008.

/

/Apfc Cramer
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on this I ^
day of March, 2008, I sent by first-class mail,
postage-prepaid, a true and correct copy of the above Reply Brief to the following parties:
Thomas B. Brunker
Christopher D. Ballard
Attorney General's Office
130 East 600 South, 6th Fioor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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ABA GUIDELINES

GUIDELINE lft.15.1—DUTIES OF POST-CONVICTION
COUNSEL
A*

B.

Counsel representing a capital client at any point
after conviction shock! be familiar with the
jurisdiction's procedures for setting execution dates
and providing notice of then. Post-conviction
counsel should also be thoroughly familiar with afl
available procedures for seeking a stay of execution.
tf

an execution date is set, post-conviction counsel
should immediately take all appropriate steps to
secure a slay of execution and pursue those efforts
through all available fora*

C

Ptett-connrtetioncounsdshouddseekto
issues, whether or not previously presented, that are
arguably meritorious under the standards applicable
to high quality capital defease representation,
including challenges to any overly restrictive
procedural rales. Counsel should make every
professionally appropriate effort to present issues in
a manner that wiB preserve them for subsequent
review.

D.

The duties of the counsel representing the client on
direct appeal should include fiing a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States.
If appellate counsel docs not intend to file such a
petition, he or she should immediately notify
successor counsel if known and the Responsible
Agency.

E.

Post-conviction counsd shonH fefy
ongoing obligations imposed by these Guidelines,
including the obligations to:

1. maintain dose contact with the cfient regarding
litigation developments; and

1079

1(V2<V20038:1SAM

DPGUDEUMBS420Q3JXX:

1080
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2. continually monitor the client's mental, physical
and emotional condition for effects on the client's
legal position;
3. keep under continuing review the desirability of
modifying prior counseTi theory of the case in
light of snbseqneat developments; and
4. continue an aggressive investigation of alii aspects
of the case.
History of Guideline
This Guideline is based cm Guideline 1 L9.3 of the original edition.
Subsections A, B, and D are entirely new. Subsection C includes new
language regarding the manna* in which post-conviction counsel must
present sill arguably meritorious issues. Subsection E includes new
language emphasizing die ongoing obligations imposed by these
Guidelines upon post-conviction counsel.
Related Standards
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION
Standard 4-8.5 ("Post-convicticm Remedies") in ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION
(3d ed 1993).
Commentary
Almost all of the duties imposed by Guidelines 10.3 et seq. are
applicable in the post-conviction context. Subsection E notes this by way
of reminder. Post-conviction counsel should ccxisult those Guidelines
and accompanying commentaries.

DPGl*DElJNES42063j>OC

2003]
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The Paramount Duty to Obtain a Stay
No matter how compelling the client's post-conviction case may
be, he faces the risk that his execution will moot it 332 This is a
phenomenon unique to capital litigation and one that must be uppermost
in the mind of post-Kxmviction counsel
When states fail to provide posi-conviction counsel entirely or in a
timely manner,333 orrequestthe setting of an execution date to advance
the litigation,334 or impose short periods of time for filing substantive
post-judgment pleadings, the result is emergency requests for stays of
execution so that substantive pleadings will be considered335 Although

332. Sfe« Brooks v.Esteflc 702 F^dW,S4-S5(5diCir. 19S3) (dismtssmg appeal, which h ^
recdved certificate tfproM
followitigtfaedefiialofaatB^

1982)).

333. There has been no right to stale post<convk^kiii o o o ^ ai Georgk. S ^ Gibaon v. T i ^ ^
513S.EJ2d 186, 188 (Ga. 1999). In August 1996, Georgia Supreme Coort Jbutax Robert Benham
noted that several persons under sentence of death in Georgia were in "immediate need of legal
lqwcaentaikxC and asked area law firms to vohmteer BflJ Rankin, When Death Raw hwnaki Go
To Com Without Lawyers: ht the Late Stages of Their Fight to Stay Alive, Some Aou* Represent
Themselves, ATLANTA JL A CONST., Dec 29, 1996, at D5 (internal quotation marks oauttedX One
Atlanta civil firm that volunteered was assigned the case of Marcus Wettons. See kL Three days
after the firm received a copy of the trial transcript, the trial court set an execution dalefortwo
weeks later. See id The firm rushed to the Georgia Supreme Coort and askedformore time to
submit aformalpost-conviction petition. See id Hoars before Mr. Weuons's *^r4nlrd execution,
the Court denied the request by a 4-3 vote. See id As guards were about to shave Mr Weuons's
headforthat evening's electrocution, the federal district coort granted a stay of execution. See id
State counsel and thefederaldefender were given ten moianstoprepare tte
A similar instance of legal Russian roulette took place in Alabama in 2001 in the case of
Thomas D. Arthur. See Armor v. rfeley, 24«FJd 13(^(1 ImCir. 20t)l) (afBrmmgpm* of amy on
day before scheduled execution to inmate who had been unrepresentedformore than two years
following direct appeal); Agency Chims Death Row Inmates Without Lawyen a G
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, March 26,2001, at B8 (describing Arthur case and absence of
any state funding for postconviction representation m Alabama). As «"BB*«H supra note 47,
counsel should be aggressive m challenging such invsnrawfliie behaviuf by the states as a federal
constitutional violation.
334. For example, in Kentucky capital cases the Attorney General invariably requests an
execution date at me end of direct appeal, and the Governor kwariably signs the death warrant No
stay of execution may be granted until the state postconviction p e t i ^
to obtam a stay, counsel must often file a state
under state law because mere is an outstanding execution date. The practice is the same in federal
habeas proceedings. See, *&, Execution ofKiBer Ddayea\ CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 9,2000, at
DIB.
335. When a capital case enters a phase of being "under warranT--i.e^ when a death warrant
has been signed—time comautraents for counsel increase, "due in lame part to the necessary
duplicatJon of effort in toe preparation of several petitions which might have to be filed
stmuitaneousty as d&erent courts." ABA POST-Cowvarnow DEATH PENALTY REPRESENTATION
PROJECT ET AU, TIME AM> EXPENSE ANALYSIS M POSTCONVICTION DEATH PENALTY CASES 10

(1987).

DPGUffiCLBffiS*2003j)OC
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the ABA and other professional voices have repeatedly condemned this
system,336 defense counsel must make the best of it—by seeking stays or
reprieves from any available source and challenging the; unfairness of
any overly restrictive constraints cm the filing of substantive pleadings
and/or stays.
And to the extent that counsel can responsibly reduce the stresses
imposed upon the client by this often nightmarish system, counsel
should of course do so (e.g., by reassuring the client of the unlikelihood
of the execution actually occurring on hs nominal date, notwithstanding
the alarming preparations being made by the prison).337
Keeping the Client Whole
Even if their executions have been safely stayed, however, the
mental condition of many capital clients will deteriorate the longer they
remain on death row. This may result in suicidal tendencies and/or
impairments in realistic perception and rational decisionmaking.33*
Counsel should seek to minimize this rid: by staying in close contact
with the client339

336. See ABA CKBONAL JUSTICE SECTION, saprn note 86, * 10-11 (cifling for automatic
federal slays throughout postconviction period); Legislative Medication,
smpra note 12, s i 855
("We agree with the P r o d i Committee [appointed by Chief Justice Refawpnst lo study reform of
capital habeas corpus] that the current mechanisms for obtaining stays of execution are irrational
and indefensible At best, they lead to an enormous waste o f legal effort by all participants in the
system, and at worst they result in inconsistencies that have fatal consequenocs."); Ira P. Robbms,

Justice by At fitmbers: The Sa)aia*
CamrtamdAeRtde€fFam'-OrisitFhfe?>y6Suf¥.V.h.
REV. 1 (2002); Eric M Freedman, Can Malice Be Served tyAppeab of the Detuff,KArhLJ.,OcL
19,1992, at 13 (current stoaation respecting stays is ^ V 4 a w to ran a judicial system").
337. See, e.g., McDonald v. Missouri, 464 U S 1306, 1307 (1984) (Btackmun, J., in
chambers).
(I thought I had advised the Supreme Court of Missoun onoe before, in Williams, that
. A . shall stay the execution o f any Missouri applicant whose direct review o f his
conviction and death scHsncr is being sought and has not been completed. I repeat the
admonition to the Supreme Court ofMissouri, and to any o f f i c e wirhm tie
of responsibility, that I shall continue that practice. The stay, of course, ought to be
granted by the state tribunal in the first Mwlatar, but, if it foils to fulfill its responsibility,
1 shaU Eurfill nunc.)
Williams v. Missouri, 463 U S 1301, 1301-02 (1983) (Blackmun, J., m chambers) (executions
scheduled fcr prior to the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari on direct appeal must be
stayed "as a natter of course").

338

SeeC.\xeVbMim0oto,AC\mwmntyDmd&

Rom Vohmktermg, 25 L A W & S o c . lNQUBtY 849, 850 (2000) (noting that **[b]etwecn 1977 and
March 1998, 59 [condemned] inmates had volunteered for execution compmed to 382 executed
unwittingly"); see also mfina note 351.
339,

See smprtx text accoaanaflying notes 1S9-92
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Counsel's ongoing monitoring of the client's status, required by
Subsection E(2), also has a strictly legal purpose. As described supra in
the text accompmying notes 188-92, a worsening in the client's mental
condition may directly affect the legal posture of the case and the lawyer
needs to be aware of developments. For example, the case establishing
the proposition that insane persons cannot be executed340 was heavily
based on notes on the client's mental status that counsel had kept over a
period of months.
The Labvrinfe of Post-convietion Litigation
A. The Direct Appeal
Practice varies among jurisdictions as to the limits of the appellate
process and the relationship between direct appeals and collateral postconviction challenges to a conviction or sentence.341 Issues that are only
partially or minimally reflected by the record, or thai are outside the
record, should be explored by appellate counsel as a predicate for
informed decisionmaking about legal strategy.
As Subsection C emphasizes, it is of critical importance that
counsel on direct appeal proceed, like all post-conviction counsel, in a
manner that maximizes the client's ultimate chances of success.
"Winnowing" issues in a capital appeal can have fatal consequences.
Issues abandoned by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in
another case and ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed
later.342 When a client will be killed if the case is lost, counsel should not
let any possible ground for relief go unexplored or unexplohed.343
340. See Ford v WaarrwnghL, 477 U S . 3 9 9 , 4 0 2 (1986>
341. In some states, there is a unitary appeal system in which direct appeal and collateral
challenges such as ineffective assistance of counsel chums are raised sanuhaneousiy. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (Michie Supp. 2002). In other jurisdictions, ineffective assistance of
counsel chums generally any not be raised on direct appeal but are reserved for separate postconviction proceedings. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State, 691 So. 2d 1068,1074 (Fb. 1997) (explaining
that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal> The federal
system follows metatterrule. See Massaro v. United Stales* 123 S. &
342. For e i a a ^ as d e s e r t safTOmar^
Supreme Court declined to address the merits of a petitioner's claim that his Fifth Amendment
rights were violated by the testimony of a psychiatrist who had cammed the defendant without
warrmig him that the i n t e r r ^
assert this damn on direct appeal because me Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims at
that tape. See id. at 531. The Supreme O a a t w f r B c y ^ ^
EsieOe v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). m a u Catch-2T for the defendant, the Court conchjded
npTfrlhtrnrnrrrHrrarrrrrf in fTrHi i r fnTMnrthr"rrnrrnff nf *Trmnmrin|nut m • ! i Tgiaaiuti IWI
appeal and focusing on* those more likely to prerafl, fir from bong CFaleuuc of • ^ T - ' H W T . B
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Appellate counsel must be familiar with the deadlines for filing
petitions for state and federal post-conviction relief and how they are
affected by the direct appeal. If the conviction and sentence are affirmed,
appellate counsel should ordinarily file on the client's behalf a petition
for certiorari review in the United States Supreme Court Under the
AEDPA, a client's one-year statute of limitations for filing a petition for
federal habeas corpus relief generally begins to run upon the denial of
certiorari or when the 90 days for filing a petition lias elapsed344
Appellate: counsel should therefore immediately inform successor
counsel if he or she does not intend to file a petition for certiorari or
when a petition for is denied; if successor counsel is not yet appointed,
counsel should promptly advise the Responsible Agency of the need to
designate successor counsel (Subsection D).
Appellate counsel should also advise the client directly of all
applicable deadlines for seeking post-conviction relief and explain the
tolling provisions of the AEDPA,345 emphasizing thai a state post*
conviction motion should be filed sufficiently in advance of die one-year
deadline to allow adequate time to prepare a federal habeas corpus
petition. In states in which the direct appeal and state posNx>nviction
review aie conducted in tandem,346 post-conviction proceedings may be
concluded at the same time as, or even before, the direct appeal,
effectively rendering the tolling provisions inapplicable.
In light of this mutual dependency among all the ]x>st-conviction
legal procedures, it is of the utmost importance that, in accordance with
Guideline 10.13, appellate counsel cooperate fully with successor
counsel and turn over all relevant files promptly.

the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy." Murray, ATI U.S. at 536 (quoting Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)). At the same time, the cbmn was not deemed sufficiently novel to
constitute ause for the procedural defiant because "forms of the ckum he [advanced] had been
percolating rn the lower coatsforyears at the ame o ffatsoriginal appeal" Mmruy, ATI U.S. at
536-37. Mr. Smith was therefore barredfromraising the issue mfederalhabeas proceedings, id. at
539, and was executed.
343. It isforthisreasonmat Subsection C refers to "issues... mat are arguably meritDrious
under the standards apphcabletohigh quality capital defense representation." See supra Guideline
10.8, text accompanying notes 234-36; see also supra text accompanying note 28. For examples of
such issues, see supra notes 231,271,276,307, and a*m note 352.
344. 2 S U S C §2244<dXlXA)(2000);^Ln^^
345. & r C ^ v. United States, 123 S.Ct 1042 (2XB\
346.

See* e.g.y CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT POLICIES

REGARDING CASES ARISING FROM JUDGMENTS OF DEATH 3 (2002) (petitions for writ of habeas

corpus to be fBed within 180 days of final doe dateforfilingreply brief on direct appeal); OKLA.
STAT. ANN DL 22, § 1089(DXl)(West Sopp 2003)(inotm&^
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B. Collateral Relief—State and Federal
As described in the commentary to Guideline 1.1, providing high
quality legal representation in collateral review proceedings in capital
cases requires enormous amounts of time, energy, and knowledge. The
field is increasingly complex and ever-changing. As state and federal
collateral proceedings become ever-more intertwined, counsel
representing a capital client in state collateral proceedings must become
intimately familiar with federal habeas corpus procedures. As indicated
above, for example, although the AEDPA deals strictly with cases being
litigated in federal court, its statute of limitations provision creates a
de facto statute of limitations for filing a collateral review petition in
state court Some state collateral counsel have foiled to understand the
AEDPA's implications, and unwittingly forfeited their client's right to
federal habeas corpus review.347
Collateral counsel has the same obligation as trial and appellate
counsel to establish arelationshipof trust with the client But by the time
a case readies this stage, the client will have put his life into the hands of
at least (me other lawyer and found himself cm death row. Counsel
should not be surprised if the client initially exhibits some hostility and
lack of trust, and must endeavor to overcome these barriers.
Ultimately, winning collateral relief in capital cases will require
changing the picture that has previously been presented. The old facts
and legal arguments—those which resulted in a conviction and
imposition of the ultimate punishment, both affirmed on appeal—are
unlikely to motivate a collateral court to make the effortrequiredto stop
the momentum the case has already gained in rolling through the legal
system.348 Because an appreciable portion of the task of post-conviction
counsel is to change the overall picture of the case, Subsection E(3)
requires that they keep under continuing review the desirability of
amending the defense theory of the case, whether one has been
formulated by prior counsel in accordance with Guideline 10.10.1 or not
For similar reasons, collateral counsel cannot rely on the previously
compiledrecordbut must conduct a thorough, independent investigation

347. See generally, Goodman v. Johnson, No. 99-20452 (5th Cir. Sept 19, 1999)
(unpublished); Cantu-Tzm v. Johnson, 162 F 3d 295 (5th Cir 1998). Spencer Goodman was
executed by Texas in January 2000 and Andrew Canto-Tzm was executed by Texas in January
1999.
348 S ^ genera^, RiBseUStea^,P^
CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, available at h1tp://www.cniiima^^
ug06Y.
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in accordance with Guideline 10.7. (Subsection E(4)). As demonstrated
by the high percentage of reversals and disturbingly large number of
innocent persons sentenced to death, the trial record is unlikely to
provide either a complete or accurate picture of the facts and issues in
the case.349 That may be because of information concealed by the state,
because of witnesses who did not appear at trial or who testified falsely,
because the trial attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation in
the first instance, because new developments show the inadequacies of
prior forensic evidence, because of juror misconduct, or for a variety of
other reasons.
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required.
One involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the
client Reinvestigating the case means examining the facts underlying
the conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's
performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct Reinvestigating
the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client
than was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that
was not presented previously, but also to identity mental-health claims
which potentially reach beyond sentencing issues tot fundamental
questions of competency and mental-state defeases.
As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel
has a duty in accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all
arguably meritorious issues.350 These include not only challenges to die
conviction and sentence, but also issues which may arise
subsequently.351 Collateral counsel should assume that any meritorious
issue not contained in the initial application will be waived or
procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, or barred by strict rules
governing subsequent applications.352 Counsel should also be aware that

349. See supratextaccompanying notes 47-58.
350. See supra Guideline 10.8 and accompanying commentary. As Subsection C emphasizes,
the duty to investigate and present such claims applies to "all issues, whether or not previously
presented" Until previously unpresented issues are fully explored, there is no way to determine
whether or not any arguably applicable forfeiture doctrines may be overcome. See House v. Bell,
311 F 3d 767 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert denied, 123 S. Ct 2575 (2003) (certifying to state
courts issue of whether procedural vehicle existed to present evidence of mnocence first uncovered
during federal habeas proceedings)
351. For example, although the Justices disagree on the point, as shown most recently by their
varying op«Jons respectmg the ccrtioran pe
123 S. Ct 470 (2002), it may
well be that after a certam length oftomecoiatminrt cojiiiiriwirt on death row ripens into an Eighth
Arrierjdment violation.
352 See Mason v. Meyers, 208 FJd 414,417 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating tint as a result of the
strict ruks gjovermng successive habeas corpus petitions enacted by the AEDPA and codified at 28
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any change in the availability of post-conviction relief may itself provide
an issue for fiirther litigation.353 This is especially true if the change
occurred after the case was begun and could be argued to have affected
strategic decisions along the way.

U S . C . §2244(b), "it is essential thai habeas petitioners include m their first petition cdl potential
claims for which they wt£& desire to sock review and relief).
353. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997) (discussing the retroactive
application of various procedural provisions in the AEDPA to pending cases).

